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T
he Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea offers an opportunity of regulating by peaceful means such universally significant juridical, economic and political subjects as the redefinition of zones of influence over the sea, of replacing such power-policy conflicts as have occasionally flared up 1 with a negotiated settlement from the outset. The mere fact of a renewed meeting of the Conference, however, reveals the laboriousness of implementing such a strategy of common sense. So far the Conference has had seven sessions totalling altogether 47 weeks (sic). 
Changing Function of the Seas
The greatly increased interest that is nowadays shown in problems of the Law of the Sea, compared with the past, derives chiefly from the changed function of the seas. Economic exploitation of the seas, which account for 70 % of the surface of the globe, has been very considerably intensified and extensified since the last two Conferences on the Law of the Sea~. Thus marine * HWWA-Institut fur Wirtschaftsf~ 1 Cod war about Iceland; Greek-Turkish frictions in the Aegean shipping has undergone an exceedingly dynamic development in line with the general expansion of international trade. The number of ships employed has been doubled, their tonnage and cargo carrying capacity has been trebled. The consequence, however, has been a marked exacerbation of transport, safety and environmental problems which urgently call for regulation.
International fisheries have undergone a similar development. The sea and its live resources at present account for 3 % of the world population's foodstuff consumption and cover 11% of its animal protein consumption. The fish reserves of the seas are nowadays exploited far more systematically than in the past, through the employment of highly efficient technologies. World catches have risen from 40 mn ts in 1960 to 70 mn ts in 1976. This has been accompanied by over-fishing of certain species, to the point of endangering stocks, and by conflicts among the fishing nations concerning fishing rights. International agreements on fish stock protection, on national fishing zones and on the fishing rights of third parties can no longer be put off. They are necessary, however, also on the as yet unexhausted potential of live resources which, without threat to stocks, probably amounts to nearly double the present catch totals. on the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and its progress. So far the real importance of marine raw materials can only be perceived in outline since no more than 3 % of the seabed has been systematically investigated. Of overwhelming importance at present are undoubtedly the energy raw materials of the seas, whose exploitation has risen rapidly since the last Conferences on the Law of the Sea. At present about 20 % of the world's crude oil production and 10% of the world's natural gas production are extracted from deposits of the continental shelf; 20% each of presently known oil and gas reserves are situated in the off-shore zone. The growth-policy key role of energy raw materials and the worldwide run on these resources have increased the need for the definition of mandatory boundaries of coastal seas and continental shelves -a burden which the current Conference has inherited from its two predecessors.
Key Role of Marine Raw Materials
An entirely new dimension for the Conference has arisen from the numerous mineral raw materials, above all the metalliferous manganese nodules of the seabed which have since become the most controversial issue at the Conference. These complex-composition nodules contain numerous minerals: in addition to iron and manganese there is mainly copper, nickel and cobalt which are likely to play a major part in future world raw material supplies. According to American estimates the reserves of marine nodules amount for copper to 15 times, for nickel to 1,500 times and for manganese to as much as 4,000 times the known deposits on land. In spite of entirely novel and exceedingly capital-intensive technologies the problems of exploration, extraction and metallurgy would seem to be closer to a solution than the juridical and economic problems. In principle all states are advancing claims to the wealth of the seabed -although only a few industrialized countries with advanced marine technologies are in fact in a position to exploit the deposits. The Conference on the Law of the Sea is faced with the historic task of resolving the conflict between the "right of the stronger" and the still valid high-sea status of the seabed on the one hand and the principle of the "common heritage of mankind" on the other.
Heterogeneous Interests
The intensification and extensification of the exploitation of the sea has resulted in a considerable enlargement of the circle of participants compared with earlier Conferences on the Law of the Sea, whereby the interests of these participants are exceedingly divergent. This heterogeneity has led to numerous coalitions which have become serious obstacles to the progress of the Conference. The principal groupings include the "territorialist", the littoral states, the shipping nations, the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states, the "Oceanic Group", the group of archipelago states, as well as the important "Group of 77" which includes most of the developing countries. A "political algorism" for the harmonization of the multiple interests of these and other groups has not so far been found. "Package dealing", usually a tested technique at international conferences, has become an extremely difficult task.
Progress of negotiations at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea finally also suffers from an economically determined politicization. As a result of a growing worldwide awareness of resources the Conference, from its very beginning, has no longer had the character of a specialized juridical conference. It has become increasingly clear that behind all the wrangling over the legal status of the different marine regions there is a fierce dispute about participation in those attractive marine resources. Inevitably the Conference on the Law of the Sea has become part of the general North-South conflict. Even though there has not been a polarization right across the board on all the issues before the Conference, the debate of the problem of deep sea mining, in particular, clearly reveals the close connection between this debate and the general dispute about the New International Economic Order. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea is quite obviously being viewed by the developing countries as a test case for the reorganization they are striving for. Seen thus the Conference is a chapter in the global struggle for the distribution of prosperity, resources and political power.
State of Negotiations
As expected, the Sixth Session of the Conference on the Law of the Sea again failed to provide the long hoped-for breakthrough. Even before a single point of the controversial convention was discussed the 1,400 delegates from 142 countries were first of all embroiled in a procedural conflict. For nine days (sic) argument continued about the mandate of the (until then) Chairman of the Conference, H. S. Amerasinghe, who, because of a change of government in the state of Sri Lanka, had lost his delegate status. Eventually, in a divided vote, he was confirmed in his post in the face of opposition from the Latin American countries. Only then did the Conference proceed to its agenda proper.
In spite of their rejection as an official subject under negotiation, especially by the delegations of the industrialized countries, the controversial details of the Third Draft Convention, submitted to the Sixth Session by the Conference management as a basis for discussion, were again debated in Geneva. This Draft reflects the political implications of the whole set of problems of the Law of the Sea. It contains, in a manner not to be overlooked, the position of the developing countries and of the states supporting them and in no way reflects the actual state of negotiations.
The view has repeatedly been expressed that the so-called "Informal Composite Negotiating Text -ICNT" 3, just as its two predecessors, contains certain irreversible prejudgements. Whether this is so will depend on what further procedure the plenary session of the Conference will agree on during the next round of negotiations, or rather on what persons with what authorities will be charged with a revision of the ICNT, and which delegations will demand changes with what insistence 4. The procedure, moreover, could well be of importance generally also to the continuation of the Conference.
In spite of controversial details one thing is emerging clearly with regard to the future International Law of the Sea: a "creeping jurisdiction" will result in a far-reaching nationalization and zoning of the world's oceans such as has long begun to take shape through numerous unilateral national decisions. Only for the reduced area of the high seas, in particular for the deep seabed, will there be an international regime.
Coastal Waters and Contiguous Zone
Thus the extension of territorial waters from the present three to twelve nautical miles may be regarded as generally accepted (Article3, ICNT), just as the right of peaceful passage (Article 17, ICNT) which, incidentally, will apply also to the more than 100 straits (Article 38, ICNT) which will result from the extension of coastal waters. Controversial in essence is now only the scope of Article 19, ICNT, and the question of whether national or international standards for traffic and the protection of the environment are to apply in the straits. Meanwhile 86 states have already extended their coastal waters to 12 nautical miles 5. Under the impact of the latest tanker disaster off the Breton coast agreement was reached relatively quickly in Geneva on stricter environmental provisions and measures which are to be the prerogative of the littoral state. Such a state, for example, can prescribe mandatory routes for ships with dangerous cargoes, such as oil, and issue entry regulations for its ports. Within its territorial waters a littoral state is even to be able in future to place masters of ships under arrest and bring ships forcibly into its own ports.
It is likely that the contiguous zone of 12 nautical miles' width will also be included in the new Law of the Sea; in that zone the littoral state will enjoy sovereign rights in respect of, among other things, customs, immigration and health (Article 33, ICNT). This means the de facto creation of coastal waters 24 nautical miles wide 6. A nationalization of further sea areas will probably also take place in the archipelago waters of, for instance, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mauritius and Fiji (Articles 46 ff., ICNT).
Economic Order
There is uncertainty about the future legal status of the so-called economic zone which, including coastal waters, is to extend to a maximum of 200 nautical miles (Article 57, ICNT). The introduction of the zone as such is no longer likely to be controversial now that the maritime great powers have agreed to it and that it has already been introduced by over 40 states 7; what rights, however, the littoral states are to enjoy in detail continues to be an open question. This zone, which accounts for about 21% of the sea area, contains about 80 % of marine fish stocks. Here also lie all the known economically exploitable off-shore reserves and 87% of all presumed hydrocarbon deposits below the seabed. Apart from the manganese nodules of the deep sea nearly all the mineral marine resources at present thought exploitable are located in that zone 8. The littoral states, according to ICNT, are to enjoy exclusive rights for all forms of economic exploitation of marine resources as welt as for exploration and environmental protection within that zone (Articles 56 and 59, ICNT). Fishing rights are to be granted by the littoral states to other states in respect of the surplus not required for their own needs, on the basis of appropriate treaties. Littoral states which live predominantly by fishing are totally exempted from this provision; the other littoral states may themselves determine the conditions of such shared user rights. Shipping is granted the right of free passage.
It was mainly the geographically disadvantaged states, the leading shipping and the long-haul fishing nations that, at the Seventh Session in Geneva, again opposed an economic zone as a zone sui generis. They pleaded in favour of allowing the high seas with their universal maritime freedoms to begin immediately outside the coastal waters and of designating the economic rights of littoral states as exceptional rights in order thus to call a halt from the very outset to the extension of national jurisdiction, e.g. in the area of shipping 9 and of environmental protection 10. In addition, they are calling for objective criteria for access to the live resources as well as freedom of basic research within the economic zones. A compromise of conflicting interests has begun to take shape in Geneva on a give-and-take basis.
If the group of littoral states were to receive concessions in the matter of the continental shelf then it might consider the demand of the group of geographically disadvantaged countries concerning their fishery rights in the economic zone, and vice versa.
What was presumably the last attempt to save the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" for the economic zone and to avert the threat of nationalization of its resources was made in Geneva by the Vatican. The rejection of a relevant proposal symptomatically reflects the fact that the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea is not in a position to evolve international solutions to the majority of unresolved law-of-the-sea problems and is instead yielding to the expansionist aspirations of the littoral states.
High Seas and Deep Sea
Beyond the 200 nautical mile zone ICNT envisages the beginning of the high seas which are reserved to peaceful exploitation and subject to a ban of sovereignty (Articles 86 ff., ICNT). This principle is infringed only by the continental shelf regulation (Articles 76 ff., ICNT), according to which littoral states are to receive an exclusive right to the exploitation of the marine mineral wealth of the continental shelf even outside the economic zone. As a result of this regulation a further estimated 5% of the world's sea area would be nationalized 11. The poorest developing countries, and among them more particularly the land-locked countries, are, in accordance with the "Irish formula", to participate in the exploitation profit up to a maximum of 5% (Articte 82, ICNT). Even though only about 30 states have such wide continental margins, this boundary is no longer regarded as controversial in principle 12. Its accurate line, however, continues to be undefined.
During the second half of the Seventh Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea the seabed and the marine subsoil with the raw material reserves discovered there, or presumed to be present there, were without any doubt again at the centre of the negotiations. No substantial progress on this matter was, however, achieved at Geneva. The "Intermediate Session" of the Conference, to be held in New York from 21st August, 1978, will be concerned principally with attempted compromises on the mining of mineral raw materials on the seabed. The task, once again, will be the material implementation of UN Resolution No. 2749 of 1970, in which the deep sea was declared to be the "common heritage of mankind", as well as the replacement of the "Moratorium" Resolution No. 2574 of 1969, which postulates a "stand-still" for all exploitation activity pending the enactment of a new seabed regime. Both resolutions, just as the ICNT's proposal for a seabed authority (Articles 133ff., ICNT), pursue the aim of not handing over the sole exploitation of the promising seabed wealth to the industrialized countries with their superiority in technology and capital, of protecting dry-land producers among the developing countries against marketing losses, and letting the rest participate in the exploitation profits. The establishment of a Seabed Authority, which would have an exclusive exploitation monopoly, is intended at the same time as a powerful (raw materials) political instrument.
As envisaged by the developing countries, the Authority will, in this monopoly system, regulate at its own discretion the access of private or state enterprises which have no title to such access. Access to the deep sea raw materials will be possible only through the Authority's own mining enterprise in the form of joint ventures; a further condition will be the provision of marine technology and capital. The decision structure of the Seabed Authority will be characterized by the principle of "one country, one vote". This means that the developing countries would have a ma- 
